Rights Thinking by Simpson, Evan
Royal Institute of Philosophy
Rights Thinking
Author(s): Evan Simpson
Source: Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 279 (Jan., 1997), pp. 29-58
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3751304 .
Accessed: 28/05/2013 07:44
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .
Cambridge University Press and Royal Institute of Philosophy are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to Philosophy.
http://www.jstor.org 
This content downloaded from 134.153.186.189 on Tue, 28 May 2013 07:44:30 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Rights Thinking 
EVAN SIMPSON 
Judgments about right are normally circumscribed and balanced 
by other considerations but it is possible to imagine 'rights think- 
ing' as occurring without any such admixture. This pure rights 
thinking is characterized by several distinctive features. First, 
resentment, respect, and other passions of rectitude overrule sym- 
pathetic feelings of concern and compassion, love and affection. 
One responds simply as justice demands, never allowing extrane- 
ous factors to interfere with satisfaction of this moral ideal. 
Second, when claims of rights collide with personal attachments or 
calculations of benefit, the right systematically prevails. For exam- 
ple, rights thinking resists assertions presented to justify breaking 
promises to friends for their supposed greater good. Third, 
although rights entail obligations to their holders, responsibilities 
to others extend no further than these entailments within pure 
rights thinking. No general obligation of benevolence is recog- 
nized, for example, since no one in particular has a right to one's 
benevolence. Hence, fourth, as well as entailing moral protections 
for their holders and defining centres of independent agency, the 
perception of rights also promotes one's fundamental separateness 
from others. 
Taking rights thinking seriously as a feasible mode of practical 
reasoning leaves open the possibility of alternative forms associat- 
ed with an ethics of care or considerations of well-being. The pos- 
sibility of pure alternatives of these types has several interesting 
and sometimes provocative implications that I wish to defend dur- 
ing the course of this discussion. First, the independence of these 
ways of thinking suggests that there is no general answer to the 
question whether respect or compassion, rights or goods, duty or 
virtue, self or other should prevail in oral deliberation. It s philo- 
sophically futile to attempt to assign priority of place to one or 
another. Second, theories of justice, utility, and community cannot 
successfully establish any such priority, although they may play 
other valuable roles. They may serve, for instance, to articulate 
practices of thinking and to influence the identification of thresh- 
olds where one form of thinking takes over from another. Third, 
by exploring rights thinking as a practice that does not require the 
support of a philosophical theory, it is possible to gain a clearer 
Philosophy 72 1997 29 
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view of the place of rights within moral reasoning generally. In 
particular, it is possible to describe a hybrid way of thinking that 
accommodates rights, utility, and concern in relationships without 
diminishing their distinctiveness by supposing that one must be 
the foundation for the others. The approach thus helps to mark 
the limits of the usefulness of rights thinking while defending it 
from some of the unfavourable philosophical attention that it has 
received from proponents of community and utility. Because their 
critiques help to describe rights thinking in greater detail, the crit- 
icisms provide a useful place to begin. By the end, I hope to have 
confirmed the place of rights thinking among moral practices, in 
part by displaying its little-noted coherence with communitarian 
and utilitarian concerns, in part by describing the ways in which it 
is usually restricted by complementary forms of thinking. In the 
process I will also be able to indicate how the modern dominance 
of rights thinking is linked to recognizing familiar general rights 
and why extending rights beyond individuals to groups and non- 
human things is possible but also problematic. The conclusion is a 
kind of moral pragmatism for which forms of moral thinking 
should not rely upon or lead to a priori claims. 
1. Three Forms of Moral Thinking 
Differences between rights thinking and other forms of moral rea- 
soning have not received much sustained philosophical attention, 
but they are often recognized. For example, Carol Gilligan's dis- 
tinction between a justice perspective and a care perspective in 
moral thinking is widely accepted in spite of doubts about some of 
the uses to which she puts it. The former perspective exemplifies 
rights thinking, viewing persons as primarily independent rather 
than responsive agents through rules that assume separation 
between human beings. The care perspective, by contrast, is com- 
munal, stressing connection, concern for relationships and their 
responsibilities. Thus, confronting a druggist who insists upon his 
right to make a profit even at the cost of another's suffering, 
Gilligan's Amy 'considers the problem to arise not from the drug- 
gist's assertion of rights but from his failure of response'. She sees 
'a world of relationships ... where an awareness of the connection 
between people gives rise to a recognition of responsibility for one 
another'.' 
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1982), pp. 28-35. 
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Distinguishing between the perspectives of rights and justice, 
care and community does not entail that individuals will display 
only one of them. Pure rights thinkers are absolutists for whom an 
established right always trumps other considerations, but most 
people are sensitive to a diversity of circumstances in which rights 
may sometime be allowed to prevail over tender responsibilities, 
sometimes not. Even for those who think mainly in terms of rights 
there may be occasions on which concern for others takes prece- 
dence. However, this point has a weaker and stronger form. The 
weaker, to which I will return in discussing hybrid thinking, 
reflects an established priority of rights thinking over other forms, 
given which considerations of right easily prevail over other moral 
claims in most circumstances. By contrast, Gilligan's examples of 
the contrasting orientations are meant to express the logical prima- 
cy of separation and of connection respectively.2 Here, sharper dif- 
ferences remain. The justice orientation is expressed in assertions 
of rights that raise the question how independent individuals ever 
establish connections, relationships of trust, etc. From that per- 
spective the answer is easy and direct: one sees relationships in 
terms of contractual connection rather than original attachment. 
The viewpoint thus accounts for relationships without departing 
from pure rights thinking. From the care perspective, however, 
the rights view distorts important human realities by seeing con- 
nection as derivative from from self-interest and personal choice.3 
Another supposed deficiency of rights thinking is evident from 
the care perspective. When we try to say what we mean by 'rights' 
we will soon start talking about obligations, explaining that for one 
to have a right is for others to have an obligation to observe it. 
However, as I have already tried to indicate, the converse relation 
does not necessarily hold: there may be obligations for which there 
is no correlative right. An imperfect obligation, such as the duty of 
charity, identifies no individual as having a claim upon our assis- 
tance. Simple as this concept may be, pure rights thinkers find it 
difficult to understand. Since they see obligations as deriving from 
rights, there is no easy way for them to accommodate the imper- 
fect obligations that must have some other origin. From their per- 
spective, these seem not to be genuine obligations at all but rather 
2 Gilligan, pp. 38, 57. 3 The sharpness of rights thinking is also expressed in a 'logic of fair- 
ness' (Gilligan, p. 32) according to which having a right appears to entail 
that it is to be honoured whatever the circumstances. The softer view that 
it does not follow logically from having a right that the object of the right 
must be accorded is expressed by Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Realm of 
Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 120. 
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reflections of a kindly nature.4 From the care perspective they are 
central to morality. 
Criticism also comes from another quarter. David Lyons notes, 
'a utilitarian might reject the pattern of thinking that is entailed by 
talks of rights ... and maintain that we would be better off not to 
think in these terms'.5 Consider his example of Mary, who rents a 
house, including a garage whose private driveway only she is 
authorized to use. Let us suppose that a neighbour sometimes 
parks there in the morning without her permission, denying Mary 
access and thus violating her rights. She may resent this. Let us 
further suppose, though, that Mary is in no way inconvenienced, 
that the neighbour knows that she never uses the drive until the 
afternoon, and that she knows that they share this knowledge. A 
utilitarian thinker will question whether there is any good reason 
for Mary's resentment at an act that does her no harm. Her atti- 
tude seems irrational, bearing out suspicion that rights provide 
excuses for creating situations that are worse rather than better, as 
when Mary refuses use of her driveway. 
Of course, it is possible to describe Mary's rights as consistent 
with the primacy of utilitarian thinking, thereby identifying an 
acceptable basis for her resentment. If utility justifies social prac- 
tices and institutions, including those characteristics of owning 
and renting property together with the rights involved, then as one 
who defends the institution on the grounds of its social usefulness, 
Mary can reasonably press the right it gives her, even if it means 
inconveniencing her neighbour at no benefit to anyone. Rights 
thinking is thus assimilated to pure utilitarian thinking. However, 
this combination is philosophically unstable. It requires saying 
that rights that have a basis in their utility cannot be overriden by 
utility, contrary to the utilitarian form of thinking in which the 
basic object of practical judgment is to make things better. Of 
course, this criticism invites engagement with a now complex and 
subtle theoretical debate about rights and utility, but the ongoing 
character of the debate makes it clear that rights thinking will 
remain a questionable practice from the standpoint of utility. 
However, utilitarian thinking is also questionable from contrary 
perspectives. The pure utilitarian thinker is a calculating individ- 
4 Cf. Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's 
Practical Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 191-192. 
The difficulty for rights thinkers is evident in Robert Nozick's Anarchy, 
State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), where in place of a 
duty of charity there is only the right to help the needy. 
5 David Lyons, 'Utility and Rights', in J. Waldron, ed., Theories of 
Rights (Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 127. 
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ual who is liable to a dubious elitism. The obvious examples 
belong to public rather than private life. Utilitarians who do not 
take rights as seriously as Mary does are sometimes found among 
officials who reflect that on certain occasions they can benefit the 
public by transgressing the law that binds others. Even if the law 
is justified by the useful opportunities it creates or by the social 
evils it deters, utilitarian thinking does not support a fully general 
obligation to adhere to it.6 This is an obvious fault, though, only if 
it is supposed that the rule of rights always prevails against utility. 
Since difficult choices will probably always arise in public life, 
grey areas confront moral and political judgment. A plausible way 
of coping with them is through hybrid thinking that recognizes 
certain thresholds. In contrast to pure thinking of any type, such 
hybrid thinking accommodates a variety of considerations depend- 
ing upon the particular circumstances. This element of casuistry 
rules out a fully general explanation of how thresholds and cir- 
cumstances combine to warrant judgments, but illustrations can be 
given as we progress. It is clear, moreover, that hybrid thinking 
does not insist that rights rest upon utilities after the fashion of 
rule-utilitarianism. In general, hybrid thinking makes no attempt 
to settle the question of primacy by identifying the basis of moral 
thinking in rights, utility, or concern for others. Rather, in accom- 
modating several forms of thinking, it supposes that they are 
appropriate in different situations. 
Hybrid thinking is thus also to be distinguished from a theory 
that says that one should make the consequences of one's actions 
as good as possible while locating adherence to rights as itself 
among the goods. Such a theory, by grafting a principle of right 
onto the utilitarian perspective in this way, creates the attractive 
possibility of representing consequentialism as itself a version of 
the rights perspective.7 Since rightness includes abiding by rules, 
putting public benefit over the rule of law might then be rejected 
and resentment like Mary's justified. However, assimilating moral 
perspectives in this way is again problematical. If justice is a good 
then either other greater goods can override it or they cannot. In 
the former instances the conflict between justice and utility reap- 
pears; in the latter we are returned to pure rights thinking. There 
is thus ample reason to question the stability of any such conjunc- 
tion of principles and the theories they constitute. In any event, I 
suggest that theories arise in support of the different answers to 
practical questions given in alternative forms of thinking. They do 
6 Cf. Lyons, p. 133. 
7 Thus Jonathan Dancy, 'Caring About Justice'. Philosophy 67 (1992), 
447-466, pp. 454-455. 
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not replace those forms, bring them basically into question, or 
convincingly separate grey areas into black and white. On the con- 
trary, the principles that define moral theories are deficient in 
rules for determining when crucial thresholds are crossed: it is a 
matter of judgment whether particular circumstances call for 
rights to be upheld, for expediency to rule, or for personal rela- 
tionships to be protected. 
Historical reflection suggests that the development of a moral 
theory affects practices of moral thinking and the location of the 
thresholds where they are invoked. Rights thinking in particular 
has been strongly influenced by theories of rights that make it 
more sophisticated than innocent expressions of resentment and 
respect and more resistant to being set aside for utilitarian consid- 
erations or the demands of personal relationships. However, this 
important influence appears to be secondary to the practice of 
rights thinking, which is more deeply established than any theory 
of rights. Like other coherent practices, rights thinking is able to 
resist demands for external justification. Defined by constitutive 
rules of inference and relevance that distinguish it from thinking 
in terms of social benefit or concern for others, one either takes 
part in it or one does not, and doing so, in contrast to asserting a 
theory, places one in no danger of refutation. To be sure, since 
thinking in terms of rights and thinking in terms of benefit or con- 
cern can produce conflicts, questions of justification do arise. To 
focus upon forms of thinking is not to suppose that we must 
uncritically accept whatever practices have actually developed. 
However, these questions of justification do not promote aspira- 
tions to identify one best practice, for they concern the appropri- 
ateness of following the practice in certain circumstances. They 
are of the sort, 'how can you allow this person's right to life to be 
compromised by the general good in a case like this?' In contrast 
to conflicts between theories of utility and rights, these circum- 
stantial conflicts do not demonstrate that one of the practices is 
false and should be set aside or that one is secondary and properly 
subsumed under the other. 
2. Rights and Rights Talk 
By a 'theory of rights' I mean a set of general principles that iden- 
tify rights as criteria for assessing and justifying actions, decisions, 
and judgments, and specify orders of precedence between rights 
and other moral considerations, such as utilities and personal rela- 
tionships. Thus, the principle that everyone has a right to life is 
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used in justifying the judgment that murder is wrong even if the 
deed benefits many people or repays a betrayal. However, in pro- 
viding reasons for action there is considerable intellectual distance 
between naively identifying something as right or wrong and iden- 
tifying the further things-the rights and wrongs-invoked to con- 
firm these judgments. Whenever people feel emotions such as 
resentment and indignation, they take themselves or others to have 
been wronged in some respect. Wherever institutions of property 
and practices of promising exist, it is deemed right to respect oth- 
ers' possessions and to fulfil one's obligations. Such judgments 
carry no special ontological commitments, but where rights and 
wrongs are supposed to exist, there is also a conceptual edifice that 
invites philosophical interest, concern, theoretical debate, refine- 
ment, and further debate. 
One of the great critics of rights, Jeremy Bentham, provides a 
rationale for distinguishing rights thinking from theoretical dis- 
putes in saying that the word 'right' 'in its adjective shape ... is as 
innocent as a dove: ... passing in at the heart, it gets possession of 
the understanding'.8 It is only in its substantive form, as in 'I have 
a right', that the word licences confusion. This confusion is per- 
haps apparent in the thought that murder is wrong because a per- 
son has a right to life. Why should this justification be necessary? 
Is it not a moral datum that murder, as a form of undeserved 
harm, is simply wrong?9 Rights, as theoretical entities, appear to 
do little useful work. Worse, by inviting unnecessary controversy, 
they may undermine an innocent sense of right and wrong. 
The Oxford philosopher, J. L. Austin, echoed Bentham in 
announcing, 'In vino veritas but in sober symposium, verum'.1° 
The statement is a reminder that it is often easy to agree that a 
statement is true (verum), but when it comes to truth (veritas) there 
is commonly disagreement. In the same way, it is often easy to 
agree about what is right, but when it comes to the nature of rights 
the story is completely different. Yet, there is an innocent sense of 
'truth', as in 'Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth', that is, say what is true, speak honestly. 
There is also an innocent sense of 'rights'. Laws often define 
rights, as do customary practices. Thus, respect for law can 
8 See Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, as excerpted in Jeremy 
Waldron, Nonsense upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of 
Man (London: Methuen, 1987), p. 68. 9 Compare Elizabeth Wolgast, 'Wrong Rights', Hypatia, 2 (1987), 
25-43, p. 39. 
10 J. L. Austin, 'Truth', in Philosophical Papers (Oxford University 
Press, 1961), p. 85 
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include respect for the rights that the law creates. This respect 
constitutes those rights as reasons for action that can override 
other potential reasons, such as concern for a friend or the good of 
the community, which are often poor excuses for violating a right. 
Respect for custom also acknowledges rights and permits the judg- 
ment that a boundary is inexcusably crossed when considering the 
good of one to whom a promise has been made is allowed to over- 
ride the right conferred in promising. These rights are clearly 
human contrivances. They do not originally call out for the sup- 
port of a moral theory and therefore entail no close connection 
between rights thinking and philosophical theories of rights. 
The innocent sense of 'rights' and a distinction between rights 
thinking and theoretical thinking about rights are easily sustained 
so long as we focus on the rights that arise from acts of legislation 
and the special rights created voluntarily by participants in social 
practices. However, the problematical rights for Bentham are the 
supposed natural, human, or general rights that become prominent 
in modern culture. Such general rights impose obligations upon 
everyone and do not arise out of particular transactions or relation- 
ships.11 I will discuss such rights in the latter half of this essay, 
noting that even they can be disentangled from problematical 
theories and verbal 'nonsense upon stilts'. However, doing this 
successfully depends upon taking Bentham's concerns seriously, 
displaying general rights as distinct from the natural rights sup- 
posed to follow from a sound moral theory. Doing without theor- 
etical thinking of this kind has the important advantage of helping 
to free 'human rights' from the ambiguity that causes them to 
appear sometimes as 'natural' but sometimes, more acceptably, as 
'general'. This task is itself significantly furthered by distinguish- 
ing between thinking in terms of rights and talking in terms of 
rights, thereby protecting a coherent practice of thinking from ver- 
bal carelessness or confusion. Against the background of this dis- 
tinction it will be possible to state the differences between practical 
and theoretical thinking more fully. 
L. W. Summer observes that 'Public issues are now routinely 
phrased in the language of rights'.'2 In a similar, if more combat- 
ive, vein, Roger Scruton notes that 'the notion of "rights" ... has 
achieved an unnatural predominance in the language of politics'.13 
" See H. L. A. Hart, 'Are There Any Natural Rights?', in Waldron, 
Theories of Rights, pp. 84-88. 
12 L. W. Summer, The Moral Foundation of Rights (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1987), p. 1. 
13 Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1980), p. 50. 
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The same theme is further developed by Mary Ann Glendon, who 
laments the fact that 'genuine exchange of ideas about matters of 
high public importance has come to a virtual standstill' and suggests 
that 'the prominence of a certain kind of rights talk in our political 
discussions is both a symptom of, and a contributing factor to, this 
disorder in the body politic'.14 All agree that the word 'rights' has 
not always dominated public discourse. Before the 17th century, the 
main focus of political morality was a person's duties-what people 
owed their lords and masters, for example, according to their social 
station, together with the obligations of nobility. Moreover, the fact 
that rights talk has gained this prominent position is clearly connect- 
ed with the reorganization of society around individual agents, 
hence with weakening responsibility for others and diminished con- 
cern for the general good. However, it is one thing for the evolution 
of society to enable the rhetoric of rights to become effective and 
another for rights talk to express morally valid and coherent political 
thinking. The predominance of the discourse of rights does not by 
itself demonstrate these intellectual virtues. On the contrary, when 
measured against good rights thinking rights talk can evidently be 
extended too far, as Scruton and Glendon suggest. 
Leaving political discourse aside for the moment, excessive 
rights talk can be heard in an active debate about the connection 
between rights and personal relationships. It is held on the one 
side that friends should not stand upon their rights. 'If you are my 
friend, ... there are many ways in which you do not need to respect 
my rights. You can invade my privacy, interrupt what I am doing, 
fail to respect my private property. ... In these situations I do not 
experience my rights as being violated or myself as waiving or 
deciding not to claim my rights. I do not conceptualize the situa- 
tion in terms of rights at all'.'5 On the other side it is held that for 
friends to recognize one another's rights may enhance the quality 
of their relationship. It is, after all, perfectly appropriate to speak 
of 'rights to respect and concern between friends' and to say, 'As 
your friend, I have a right to more consideration and respect'.'6 
14 Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political 
Discourse (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. x. Since Sumner is 
Canadian and Scruton British, one would like a fuller account of her fur- 
ther perception that 'there must be a ... specifically American explana- 
tion ... for the persistent absoluteness in rights talk that is still more com- 
mon in the United States than elsewhere' (p. 42). 
15 John Hardwig, 'Should Women Think in Terms of Rights?', in 
Feminism & Political Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1990), p. 56. 
16 Cf. Michael J. Meyer, 'Rights Between Friends', Journal of 
Philosophy 69 (1992), 467-483, p. 477 and 481. 
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However, while 'I have a right' may sometimes be an acceptable 
verbal alternative in describing the requirements of a close rela- 
tionship, thinking in terms of relationships has a demonstrably 
different structure from thinking in terms of rights. Compare the 
familiar wedding vow, 'I promise to love, honour, and obey,' the 
second and third parts of which are often thought to be demeaning 
to free agents but the first part of which is clearly impossible.'7 
Promises do confer rights, even upon friends, but promises are 
voluntary acts whereas loving is not within one's power to will 
directly. One might deliberately cultivate habits that can lead to 
love, but one cannot be sure that the desired effect will result. 
Hence one cannot promise love as one can promise obedience; and 
if one cannot promise love, then for the same reason one cannot 
promise concern and respect either. 
There is one way in which to bring rights talk and rights think- 
ing together here. It is perfectly possible to give another person 
the right to expect that one will always act in certain ways, and 
the promise of 'love' and the like could be interpreted as a 
promise of loving behaviour rather than emotional connection. 
Pure rights thinkers could justify speaking of the right to love, 
concern, and respect in this case. However, when such inveterate 
rights thinkers reinterpret their language in this way, they do so 
at the cost of accentuating the separateness of persons to an extent 
that displays limited appreciation of the reasonableness of think- 
ing in terms of relationships. Moreover, since few people consis- 
tently hold to the view that all relationships between individuals 
rest upon promises, bargains, or contracts, talk of obligations to 
love, honour, and obey together with the corresponding rights 
should usually be suspected of verbal exuberance rather than 
admired as a sign of clear thinking. The signs of this exuberance 
can be described in contrasts with some of the basic marks of 
rights thinking. Where rights talk dominates, non-philosophers 
may not reduce descriptions of emotional relationships to 
accounts of behaviour, but they do tend to muddle the passions of 
rectitude. Rather than expressing resentment and indignation, 
with their conceptions of justice, they exhibit belligerency and 
anger when their wishes as friends or lovers are neglected. One 
thus tends to lose the distinction between what one wants and 
what one is entitled to. 
A supporting illustration of differences between rights thinking 
and right talk can be drawn from Lawrence Kohlberg's 6-stage 
account of moral maturation. Within his developmental picture 
there is a sharp distinction between the forms of assessment 
17 Thus, Elizabeth Wolgast, 'Wrong Rights', p. 37. Cf. Hardwig, p. 57. 
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characteristic of thinking about personal and political relation- 
ships. Rights thinking emerges only with the stage-4 'law-and- 
order' orientation, prior to which people think in terms of good 
and bad. Thus, at stage-3 'good behaviour is that which pleases or 
helps others and is approved by them'.18 One could as well speak of 
'rights behaviour' here, but that is simply to acknowledge that to 
this point there is no conceptual differentiation between the right 
and the good.19 Such 'good boy/nice girl' thinking is as easily dis- 
tinguished from developed rights thinking as the claim of children 
who say 'it's mine,' meaning 'I want it' rather than 'I have a right 
to it'. Of course, it is no part of my purpose to endorse Kohlberg's 
stage-account, whose hierarchically ranked cognitive structures 
require assumptions that go well beyond the distinctive practices 
of thinking that can be described without these assumptions. 
However, the several forms of thinking he successfully distin- 
guishes, along with failures of communication that occur between 
people who use different forms, show that conceptual sharpness is 
lost if 'rights' are spoken of before they have gained clear defini- 
tion. 
These illustrations are not to imply a sharp boundary between 
the ways in which people think and the language used to express 
these thoughts, The connection between mental processes and 
their modes of expression is philosophically well established. It is 
nevertheless desirable to draw the distinction between the 
rhetorical surface of the culture of rights and the substance of 
culture as clearly as possible.20 Doing so may discourage us from 
invoking the language of rights too casually, falling uncritically 
into habits of speaking that lead to calling anything of value a 
right.21 Although, it may seem harmless to debase the coinage in 
talking of 'rights to respect and concern' within personal rela- 
tionships, there is less reason to be sanguine in political 
instances, such as the 'manifesto rights' characteristic of many 
modern political charters. The United Nations Universal 
Charter of Human Rights, for example, speaks of rights that 
oblige no one in particular, appearing to conflate valid claims 
18 Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development (San 
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), pp. 155, 166-167. 
19 This point is developed in Evan Simpson, Good Lives and Moral 
Education (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), pp. 151-152. 
20 The distinction between rhetoric and substance is drawn by Alasdair 
Maclntyre in 'The Privatization of Good', The Review of Politics, 52 
(1990), 344-361, p. 349. 
21 Cf. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986), p. 165. 
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with needs.22 The African Charter on Human and People's Rights 
adds putative communal rights, stating that 'all peoples shall have 
the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their 
development'.23 There may be good strategic reasons for such 
rhetorical licence (it provides a way of advancing interests that 
should be taken seriously, for example), but this discourse of 
rights does not necessarily connect with rights thinking. Rather it 
expresses communal aspirations that may be more defensible with- 
out reference to rights. I return to this point at the end of the dis- 
cussion. For now I hope only to have indicated that it is possible 
and desirable to note how rights thinking includes conceptual 
articulations that distinguish it from the thinking expressed in less 
discriminating rights talk. My intention is thus not to describe 
how people generally think about rights but how those who exem- 
plify the distinctive practice of rights thinking do. 
Yet another plausible example of rights talk in the absence of 
clear rights thinking is evident in claims that convert offending 
social forms into ostensible violations of rights, as when the pain 
caused to women by some salacious literature is construed as an 
injustice. Foe example, when the existence of 'girlie' magazines 
arouses feelings of humiliation in some, the effect may be cast as a 
subordination of women, hence as a violation of the basic rights 
that should be enjoyed by all persons in a free society. One way in 
which to establish the point would be to identify subordination 
and pictures of subordination.24 Given this equation it would be 
reasonable to resent the fact that men can buy girlie magazines, 
since possessing the pictures is then tantamount to denying 
women equality, contrary to their established rights. However, the 
identification of subordination with depictions of subordination is 
as logically suspect as promises of respect among friends. The 
vocabulary of rights is not in this case supported by good reasons, 
which may rather fit characterizations of pornography as a social 
22 On 'manifesto rights' see Joel Feinberg, 'The Nature and Value of 
Rights', in Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton University 
Press, 1980). Short of conflating rights and needs, one can of course 
argue that 'People have a right to what they need', as claimed in the 
opening sentence of Evan Simpson, 'The Priority of Needs over Wants', 
Social Theory and Practice, 9 (1982), pp. 95-112. 
23 The Charter, of which this is Article 24, is reprinted in C. M. Peter, 
ed., Human Rights in Africa (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
1990), pp. 103-116. 
24 Theoretical foundations for such a view are constructed by Melinda 
Vadis, 'A First Look at the Pornography/Civil Rights Ordnance: Could 
Pornography Be the Subordination of Women?', Journal of Philosophy, 
84 (1987), pp. 487-511. 
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evil.25 Because rights talk is unconvincing in this case, resorting to 
it may generate distracting debate, making it more difficult to 
address the evil effectively. 
An alternative equation helps to establish the point even more 
clearly. It can be said that feelings of subordination are tanta- 
mount to the existence of subordination, so that where such feel- 
ings occur basic rights are violated. Now, it is certainly arguable 
that corrective social action is warranted when feelings of subordi- 
nation are prevalent, but the argument does not depend upon sur- 
rendering the ability to distinguish between emotional responses 
and the objective considerations that justify them. It is sufficient 
to note that when many people are made unhappy by the actions of 
others, the public interest is reasonably aroused. However, the 
basis of this interest is social utility. To speak of fundamental 
rights in this connection generates unproductive confusion which 
is only compounded by the absence of convincing arguments in 
response to the point that existing rights of free expression conflict 
with the supposed right not to be subjected to painful experiences. 
The point of these observations is to avoid a regimentation of 
moral language that is supported only by contentious theoretical 
equations. This is not to banish rights talk from debates about 
pornography. A place for it can be preserved by identifying weaker 
but still significant connections between subordination and feel- 
ings or pictures of subordination. In the one case, it is possible to 
sustain the distinction between offending and offensive material- 
that is, between material that arouses unwanted feelings and mate- 
rial that is worthy of offense-while acknowledging that people are 
rarely offended for no reason. By exploring these reasons sensi- 
tively, one might find that they support a circumscribed right not 
to be offended in certain ways. In the other case, it may be possi- 
ble to provide evidence that depictions of subordination influence 
men to behave towards women as their masters or that forms of 
subordination are often involved in the production of these depic- 
tions. Given a general right of equality, the evidence of such 
broadly causal connections, if it can be sustained, shows that there 
is a place for rights thinking here. My point is simply that it is a 
mistake to allow rights talk to intrude too readily, and possibly 
harmfully, into matters of social concern. 
There is a further patent liability in expressing any plausible 
interest through rights talk. Extending the vocabulary too far may 
impair capacities for rights thinking, degrading a conceptual 
25 Cf. W. A. Parent, 'A Second Look at Pornography and the 
Subordination of Women', Journal of Philosophy, 87 (1990), 205-211, p. 
211. 
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resource that has in the past helped to advance important causes. 
The historical extension of the discourse of rights may in this 
respect be a poor practical guide to the future. Briefly reviewing 
well-known parts of this history helps to display the main virtues 
of rights thinking while beginning to indicate some of its limita- 
tions. It also shows that while a culture of rights may have been 
facilitated by ontological reflections about human freedom, equali- 
ty, and independence as it became established, the vitality of this 
culture does not continue to depend upon the truth of an indepen- 
dent theory of human nature. This is important because it permits 
reserving a place for general rights while heeding Bentham's 
admonitions about the verbal nonsense of 'natural' rights. 
3. History and Theory 
Rights are important to the organization of the liberal societies 
that are marked by social pluralism, mutual accommodation, inde- 
pendent producers, and equality of citizenship. Rights thinking 
became a major political practice only with the decline of feudal- 
ism and the development of a less tradition-bound and more open 
form of social organization. Serious political interest in rights can 
therefore be associated with the emergence of the individual from 
communities and the separation of the state from the main reli- 
gious and economic institutions. In the absence of a state religion, 
there is freedom of individual conscience; and with the relative 
independence of property from the state, the primary economic 
actors become private persons. One's status as an agent then 
depends upon freedom to think and to act, freedoms well protect- 
ed by rights against alien and oppressive conceptions of the good. 
Thus, Charles Taylor links individualism with the social contract 
theory of the 17th century and the emergence of interest in general 
'rights of man', in contrast to the special rights that are typical of 
close political relationships, as between popes and emperors in an 
earlier era, or are generated by the deliberate actions of particular 
individuals within a recognized sphere of privacy.26 
In apparent conflict with Taylor and this generally accepted his- 
torical sketch, some scholars locate the emergence of the modern 
concept of the individual around the 12th century.27 However, 
26 Charles Taylor, 'Atomism', in his Philosophy and the Human Sciences 
(Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 188-189. 
27 For a useful discussion of rights prior to the 17th century, see Brian 
Tierney, 'Origins of Natural Rights Language: Text and Contexts, 
1150-1250', History of Political Thought, 10 (1989), pp. 615-646. 
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these views become consistent if we distinguish the time when 
individualism appeared from the time it became dominant. Peter 
Abelard expressed a form of individualism but it was not widely 
accepted in his culture, modern political consciousness having 
arisen only with the wide-spread recognition of free, equal, and 
independent individuals. This consciousness, in Taylor's view, 
was shaped by primacy-of-rights theories, but we have reason to 
call this proposition into question. When Gilligan refers to the pri- 
macy of separation she finds the priority of the individual to be a 
central feature of rights thinking and points to the consequent 
need for a contractual theory of connection, but she identifies no 
underlying primacy-of-rights theory as contributing to the devel- 
opment of this thinking. Some further argument is needed in 
order to demonstrate this supporting role, but the argument is 
absent from Taylor's account. Moreover, it is far from clear that 
the moral and political confidence expressed by the American 
Declaration of Independence and echoed in the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789 can be explained by refer- 
ence to such a theory. The confidence remains widespread, but 
primacy-of-rights theories are objects of philosophical and politi- 
cal contention by communitarians and by the rulers of authoritari- 
an states who advocate the welfare of their subjects rather than 
their human rights. The Declarations thus make claims that 
remain no less theoretically questionable that the manifesto rights 
listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, leaving the 
intellectual primacy of these theoretical claims in doubt. 
As I have already suggested, the efficacy of rights theories does 
not reside in their directly shaping the rights thinking that domi- 
nates Western political consciousness. It lies, rather, in facilitating 
the dominance of this practice of thinking by helping to lower the 
threshold for employing it. The first point is simply that there 
have long been persons in whom feelings of justice, a sense of self- 
respect, and willingness to elevate law over compassion and expe- 
diency are dominant. The form of thinking does not derive from a 
theory, rather the theory encourages such thinking. The second 
point is that the theory does this largely by making the rules of 
rights thinking easier to invoke. The effect is simple and straight- 
forward: as assertions of individual freedom and equal citizenship 
gain acceptance, the claims of personal relationships and the gen- 
eral advantage become relatively less pressing. It becomes increas- 
ingly difficult for the latter non-rights claims to weigh in heavily 
against the claims of personal agency. Annette Baier helps to illus- 
trate the point in noting that '[w]hat we regard as ours by right is 
what we are unwilling to beg for and only limitedly willing to say 
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thank you for. ... The increasing tendency to talk of universal 
rights and the extension of their content correlates with this ability 
to beg or to respond generously to beggars'.28 When persons 
increasingly depict themselves as independent agents rather than 
occupiers of social roles, general rights are able to emerge as pri- 
mary moral and political considerations that can be set aside only 
for exigent reasons. This is not only a matter of formulating con- 
cepts of freedom, equality, and independence theoretically, of 
course, since theories articulate already-occurring social changes. 
It is in this way, however, that such changes become increasingly 
reflected in conscious patterns of judgment that resist trading off 
rights against other moral considerations. 
A theory of rights like Locke's can have the interesting sec- 
ondary effect of holding the line against attempts by newer rights 
thinkers to lower the threshold still further, but the main source of 
resistance lies elsewhere. The evolution of modern society has not 
led to the extinction of personal relationships, theories of which 
encourage maintaining a relatively high threshold of appropriate- 
ness for rights thinking. This counter-pressure is especially obvi- 
ous in theories of community that define two historical poles of 
opposition to primacy-of-rights theories. On the one hand, 
Burke's opposition to the revolution in France expressed his con- 
servative respect for a still-existing political community. The 
assertion of general 'rights of man' endorsed forms of personal 
independence that could not be harmonized with 'binding up the 
constitution of our country with our dearest domestic ties'.29 On 
the other hand, Marx's admiration for that revolution rested upon 
the half-step it appeared to take towards a new form of political 
community in which human beings, no longer separated from 
their social nature, would not require egoistic rights to freedom of 
religion, private property, and the pursuit of personal happiness. 
Such potent communitarian criticisms help enable social ties to 
continue making serious moral demands. 
However, reinforcing the idea that men and women are commu- 
nal beings does not fundamentally undermine rights thinking but 
only restricts it. The critique properly identifies an affinity 
between rights and independent agency, but it does not successfully 
establish the damaging point that independent agency is tanta- 
mount to selfishness. The most interesting reason for its limited 
success is that communitarianism itself effectively protects rights 
28 Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1994), p. 226 
29 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 120. 
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thinking from charges of egoism and explains how this way of 
thinking confounds the moral doubts that arise from a focus upon 
relationships. Where rights thinking has become dominant, the 
practice exemplifies the primary insight of communitarianism, 
namely that we are deeply bound to others in ways that make us 
creatures of custom, intolerance, and absence of choice. Looked at 
abstractly, any practice consists in a set of social expectations or 
conventions that can be broken only at the expense of disapproval 
by other participants. In the case of a practice of thinking that 
includes rules of correct reasoning, deviation from these rules will 
be seen as unfortunate lapses from rationality. Looked at more 
concretely, people who suggest that a woman's place is in the 
home or that political office should be open only to owners of 
property are regarded with incomprehension by contemporary 
rights thinkers. In a liberal society, people tempted by such 
thoughts will be disinclined to express them for fear of this 
response. Rights thinking, when it becomes the mark of good 
political thinking, thus includes communitarian expectations of 
conformity. Politically correct thinking is demanded of everyone, 
on pain of conviction for irrationality and exclusion from polite 
society. The low thresholds for the general rights that belong to 
any individuals and the special rights possessed by particular per- 
sons are sustained by this unavoidable demand. 
There is nothing offensive in the demand. It simply reflects the 
need for any practice to proceed in accordance with a set of rules- 
the common expectations that express general acceptance of a way 
of acting or thinking. Of course, acceptance of this idea acknowl- 
edges only an abstract form of communitarianism. Communal 
support for rights thinking does not entail that this thinking itself 
expresses the outlook of a community except in an extremely thin 
sense, for rights thinking becomes supreme only when political 
association has become differentiated from traditional communal 
life. Nonetheless, modern political life does remain deeply com- 
munal in this one respect: by binding people together in a common 
cognitive practice, in which each participant values the opinion of 
the others who cooperate in it, modern society is only superficially 
egoistic. 
The historical extension of general rights helps to make this 
clearer. Bentham's and Burke's forms of resistance to these rights 
express their respective views that social utility and human rela- 
tionships already take precedence over matters of abstract right at 
a low level, whereas acceptance of general rights supposes that the 
threshold for utilitarian and caring thinking is high. It is a serious 
problem for utilitarian thinkers that this high threshold is a natural 
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result of the fact that in a pluralistic society it is difficult to deter- 
mine where social utility lies except in extreme cases. For the car- 
ing perspective a similar problem results from the fact that the 
needs of complex political relationships include a system of impar- 
tial rules that are not easily set aside in favour of personal discre- 
tion.30 Nevertheless, in such circumstances the general rights that 
express the abstract equality of diverse citizens mark a relationship 
that distinguishes individual people from atomistic agents. Within 
the working political arrangements that are the home of these 
rights, the rule of right can be a vitally important shared good in 
spite of the absence of a common good in the narrower sense typi- 
cal of traditional communities.31 
There is a further respect in which rights thinking may be free 
from narrow selfishness. Since the dominance of rights thinking 
does not rest upon any independent cognitive requirement, noth- 
ing guarantees that it will endure, but it may be substantially 
altered in its content without necessarily being fundamentally 
changed. In contrast to the social contracts of the 17th century, 
which sought protection of life, liberty, and security of the person 
against arbitrary governments, the social charters of the 20th cen- 
tury would oblige governments to take positive action to mitigate 
the effects of poverty and social disadvantage. Welfare, understood 
to encompass at least a basic income, becomes a right rather than a 
mark of a benevolent society. It expresses justice rather than con- 
cern. As the right to life is extended to the right to the means of 
life, as negative liberty spawns positive liberty, and as the state 
becomes responsible for ensuring a certain approximation of mate- 
rial equality between persons, constitutional entitlements replace 
moral manifestos. As a general right welfare then stands outside 
matters that are legitimate objects of political contestation. The 
transition from the social contract to a social charter thus instills a 
further form of political relationship. 
This development, so far from the individualism of the social 
contract, would be fully consistent with rights thinking, in con- 
trast, for example, to the claim of special rights for friends dis- 
cussed earlier. However, the development refers to the content of 
rights thinking, parts of which can be promoted and resisted 
3o Compare Charles E. Larmore's 'praise of bureaucracy' in Patterns 
of Moral Complexity (Cambridge University Press, 1987) pp. 40-42. 31 On the rule of right that is a paramount good in liberal societies see 
Charles Taylor, 'Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate', 
in Nancy L. Rosenblum, Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 172ff.; and Ronald Dworkin, 
'Liberal Community', California Law Review 77 (1989), 479-504. 
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through argument. Whether rights thinking should embrace wel- 
fare rights can be contested, even by rights thinkers who see no 
sufficient rationale for the extension. It is useful to understand 
their reasons and the limitations of these reasons. One basic 
approach to welfare rights is that of Rawls, who proposes two 
independent principles of liberty and equality and defends their 
combination.32 This view is contested by Nozick, who maintains in 
effect that the principles are inconsistent.33 An alternative 
approach suggests that liberty and equality are inseparable: liberty 
being empty without the means to liberty, a principle of liberty has 
egalitarian implications.34 However, this play of concepts is incon- 
clusive. The critics of extension can challenge the equation of lib- 
erty and the means to liberty as specious, while defenders can 
insist that the charge of incompatibility is not proven. These argu- 
ments thus centre on points of logical analysis. Objections to 
extension can accept that positive rights would be well founded by 
the principle of liberty together with the independent justification 
of a principle of equality or with the correct identification of liber- 
ty and the means of liberty, but the justification is faulty and the 
identification groundless, leaving the new rights claim unjustified. 
This is the form of argument I used in suggesting that certain 
claims for rights of friends or women may be no more that rights 
talk. 
It is a form of argument that can be overused. The principal 
weakness of the logical critique is that it does not address the kinds 
of reasons most persuasively advanced for extending rights think- 
ing into new areas. Successful movements for new rights do not 
typically rely upon theoretical argument but upon experience and 
analogy. Effective arguments do not proceed by establishing that 
liberty entails the means to liberty, for example, but by extending 
the interpretation of the principle of liberty towards greater equal- 
ity through comparisons, as between poverty and prison. It is 
when people come to see impressive similarities between the 
absence of liberty and the absence of means to its effective expres- 
sion that the extension of rights to include welfare seems warrant- 
ed. No one can be logically compelled to consider the analogy a 
good one-it can be argued on the other side that providing wel- 
fare to some is like forced labour for others-but it is also true that 
there are no obvious limits the extension of rights thinking that 
32 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 
pp. 60-65, 150-161. 
33 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 164-166. 
34For one account of this general type see James P. Sterba, 'From 
Liberty to Welfare', Ethics 105 (1994), pp. 64-98. 
47 
This content downloaded from 134.153.186.189 on Tue, 28 May 2013 07:44:30 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Evan Simpson 
can occur in this way. As long as appreciation of new comparisons 
is encouraged by people's experiences, new rights will be identi- 
fied. Moreover, these extensions in the content of rights thinking 
are facilitated by the historical development in which the practice 
became politically dominant over other forms of moral thinking. 
The generally lowered threshold for rights thinking encourages the 
formulation of moral claims in terms of rights, so that claims for 
public provision are pressed as universal entitlements rather than as 
particular needs, questions of affordability are neglected, and 
effects upon social relationships are deemed secondary to the 
requirement of justice. The dominance of rights thinking may thus 
discourage questions of practical feasibility and social coherence, 
although these questions have considerable philosophical interest. 
This interest does not attach primarily to the particular contents of 
rights thinking that reflect successful political advocacy and the 
persuasiveness of certain analogies but to the overall limits of the 
practice that define the viable forms of hybrid thinking. It is the 
latter notice that I intend to consider primarily in asking how much 
rights thinking is a good thing. 
4. How Far Should Rights Thinking Extend? 
Just as rights thinking is in one respect deeply communitarian, I 
am going to suggest that it is in another respect deeply utilitarian, 
rights thinking ultimately depending upon its usefulness. It will 
prove to be a good way to think if it enables people to resolve seri- 
ous practical problems when other ways of thinking do not. 
Hobbes's warring individuals and Rousseau's inconstant compan- 
ions show how thinking only in terms of one's own advantage 
yields outcomes that are inferior to mutual advantage and how 
mutual advantage may be achieved through the recognition of gen- 
eral rights. Both Leviathan and the Discourse on Inequality offer 
accounts of human development in which natural desires become 
constrained or enlarged through a form of thinking that assigns 
legal or normative protections to all members of civil society. 
Harmful competition and indifference are then replaced by per- 
ceptions of others that command respect for their interests. Rights 
are thus useful products of human imagination and can claim a 
solid pragmatic basis. 
To be sure the value of rights thinking cannot be conclusively 
defended in this way. Pragmatic virtues explain but they do not 
clearly justify. The pragmatic defense is, in one way, not good 
enough if we are interested in the validity of a way of thinking, 
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when usefulness alone will prove disappointing. Usefulness is no 
more available as a reason for rights-thinking than the fact that 
people are happier when they believe certain things rather than 
others is a reason for belief. However, the demand for reasons 
seems misdirected in the former case. Because a form of thinking 
defines reasons for those who practice it, they determine what con- 
siderations are relevant and acceptable for the participants. Unless 
external foundations can be found for the practice it will not itself 
have reasons in this sense. It cannot then be maintained that forms 
of reasoning are accepted because they are right. 
Now, external considerations are available for assessing many 
practices. Slave-owning can be rejected for its denial of human 
equality, however exquisite the internal logic of its rules. 
However, this judgment depends upon acceptance of human 
equality as a reason against involuntary servitude, and a similar 
onus of proof resides with those who believe that there can be 
external reasons for accepting or rejecting practices that define 
reasons. Richard Flathman accepts this onus in attempting to 
show how 'the practice of rights' can best be justified, but his 
argument does not seem fully to satisfy it. He suggests for one 
thing that 'this assumption [of the intrinsic value of the individual] 
is probably essential to justifying the practice', but as I noted at 
the beginning of this discussion the assumption appears to be con- 
stitutive of the practice rather than providing a reason external to 
it. For the rest, rights are justified because 'they serve important 
interests of the individuals who exercise them' and 'protect 
arrangements, institutions, and norms important to all members 
[of society].'35 This seems tantamount to accepting usefulness as an 
explanation of rights thinking and foregoing the search for justifi- 
cation in any stronger sense. 
If this is so, then it is sufficient to recognize that rights thinking 
enjoys the allegiance of people of good will and commonsense who 
acknowledge rights in behaviour and in law as long as they contin- 
ue to prove themselves in practice. Animus against the dominance 
of rights thinking is thus misplaced, since in modern circum- 
stances a moderately low threshold for this form of thinking works 
better than any available alternative. There is still room for 
lamenting the fact that because rights thinking neglects legitimate 
claims of close personal relationships it also frustrates the civic 
friendship that is a desirable part of political life. That is to say, 
deliberating together in order to find a consensus on social purpos- 
es is not encouraged by the rights thinking that protects the partic- 
35 Richard E. Flathman, The Practice of Rights (Cambridge University 
Press, 1976). My quotations are from pages 165 and 220. 
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ular purposes of separate agents. Nonetheless, until an effective 
option of this kind becomes available, the liberal societies that take 
general rights most seriously deserve continuing loyalty. 
Even so, this resting place is rarely stable, being subject to both 
internal and external discomforts. Internally, proposals to extend 
rights beyond individual persons will be made and demand atten- 
tion. Externally, there will be concern that if practices are basic then 
any useful and consistent set of rules of thinking will be defensible 
in principle. There is thus no setting one definitively above another, 
making any way of thinking appear arbitrary or precarious. Against 
rights thinking, and in favour of it, basic ontological commitments 
may then be championed in order to give the favoured practice a 
more secure and decisive justification than coherence and practicali- 
ty provide. Thus, Burke, in deploring the barren view of general 
rights in which a king is seen as but a man rather than as an object of 
awe and veneration, promoted a conception of human beings as 
inherently related. For his liberal opponents, by contrast, kings and 
queens are properly seen as but men and women in virtue of their 
natural independence. Yet for utilitarians men and women are but 
animals-animals with unusual capacities, perhaps, but nonetheless 
animals whose primary moral attribute is their common sentience, 
leaving human beings with no privileged claim to prosper or sur- 
vive. A form of cosmic thinking pursues this declension still further: 
kings and queens, men and women, plants and animals are but 
things, none of which has special standing in the universe. 
As a response to the groundlessness of practices of thinking these 
ontological appeals are not generally compelling, although they 
may be used to support internal proposals in an interesting way. 
Consider the above declension: For a rights thinker who also views 
sentience as ontologically salient, general rights will seem to attach 
to animals or to all living things, while one who thinks of existence 
as a quality may extend rights to the cosmos. Thus, some environ- 
mentalists appeal to the nature of life in assigning general rights to 
species of animals and plants, and future defenders of Mars will no 
doubt maintain that the red planet has a right to remain in its pre- 
sent state and oppose its greening by human hands.36 However, the 
extension of rights thinking into new domains in this way is gratu- 
itous, since there is no effective way of adjudicating philosophically 
between the competing claims on which they rest. The practice- 
' Thus Don MacNiven asks seriously, 'does MVars have a right to be 
left in its natural state?', Creative Morality (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 
203. Kim Stanley Robinson develops the nice irony of casting the green 
party as the anti-environmental party in his novel, Red Mars (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1993). 
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conception does not preclude such extensions: to assign rights to 
non-human things or their environment is not incoherent. 
However, it does not encourage these assignments, since from the 
practice-view extensions of rights are not driven by ontological 
reflection but by the effectiveness of a form of thinking in identify- 
ing solutions to practical problems. 
If practices had to rest upon ontological commitment then they 
would remain as precarious as before. In the case of rights think- 
ing, the inherent questionability of any supporting ontology would 
make the moral claims that are supposed to rest upon it philosoph- 
ically suspect. Now, an appropriate reply would be that it is a 
responsibility of philosophers to avoid questionable assertions that 
certain questions cannot be answered, especially when justice may 
depend upon the answer, but there is a pair of complementary 
problems for this rejoinder. The first is that no one has shown how 
to distinguish the supposed ontological basis of a form of thinking 
from its ideological superstructure. In each case the ontology can 
be understood as an expression of the corresponding form of 
thinking as well as it can be understood as an underlying presup- 
position of that form. It is thus unclear that the competition 
between these contrasting visions can be settled or even that it 
should be. What would settle it is agreement that one or another of 
the practices of thinking they are produced to defend is correct 
thinking, but then it is the rules of thinking that count, not their 
supposed ontological rationale. This introduces the second prob- 
lem, which is that ontological commitments are, after all, neither 
expressions nor presuppositions of any practice of thinking but 
independent of them. It is notable that the extension of rights 
thinking to animals described above borrows from an idea com- 
monly associated with utilitarian thinking but which is not inher- 
ent to it either, the identification of the good being open to a vari- 
ety of interpretations. Moreover, all of the ontological conceptions 
express aspects of our existence. So it is that people, for various 
purposes, view the universe as lacking preference for living beings, 
or the world as ennobling sentient experience, or humanity as hav- 
ing no natural ranks, or particular societies as complex webs of 
relationships and distinctions. It is not necessary to make a final 
choice between these views or to use them to bolster particular 
practices of thinking, the usefulness of which for particular pur- 
poses is a sufficient warrant for them.37 
If no grounds have been identified that necessitate the extension 
of rights to non-human things, the question remains whether 
37 For another statement of the sufficiency of a practice-view see 
Dworkin, 'Liberal Community'. 
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movements for group rights can be given an adequate rationale. 
Such rights, if established, provide recognition and protection for 
particular communities and cultures rather than for individual 
agents. The arguments presented so far have defended the domi- 
nance of rights thinking that coincides with recognition of general 
rights, and they have also accepted the potential reasonableness of 
a substantive extension of the practice that embraces positive 
rights. These rights are rights of individuals, and it is commonly 
assumed that rights attach primarily to individual agents, whereas 
collective agents are tied by obligations and responsibilities.38 
While some believe this distinction to be fundamental, however, 
others want to take rights claims beyond individual persons. By 
agreeing that rights thinking can have objects that are not human 
beings, I have already indicated that such a limitation to individu- 
als is conceptually questionable, but it is worth exploring the point 
in slightly more detail and noting how the limitation might never- 
theless be pragmatically justified. 
Iris Young develops a case for certain group rights by describing 
'the disadvantage and injustice some people suffer not because a 
tyrannical power coerces them, but because of the everyday prac- 
tices of a well-intentioned liberal society' in which 'some are privi- 
leged while others are oppressed'.39 On the basis of this account it 
seems easy to justify special rights of representation for groups of 
people who suffer systematic disadvantages, together perhaps with 
the right to veto proposals that could sustain their oppression. Of 
course, such a view needs to avoid the logical problems of argu- 
ments that attempt to identify domination with pictures of domina- 
tion and liberty with equality of condition. The existence of privi- 
lege does not entail the existence of oppression. It makes sense for 
some to say that they are entitled to their privileges because of hard 
work or good fortune and that others' relative disadvantages can be 
remedied within a liberal regime of general rights. Consequently, 
rights for disadvantaged groups depend upon establishing some 
other connection between privilege and oppression. Thus, the more 
that privilege resembles freedom, for example, the more members 
of disadvantaged groups seem to lack freedoms that the rich enjoy. 
The privileges of the advantaged thus appear as defects of justice, 
since they are departures from equal freedom. Lacking equal free- 
dom, disadvantaged groups are in some sense oppressed, and jus- 
tice will require their having effective rights. 
The analogies between privilege and freedom, disadvantage and 
38 Thus Baier, Moral Prejudices, pp. 238-239. 
39 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton 
University Press, 1990), p. 41 and p. 163. 
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oppression are of course contestable. They are resisted by standard 
liberal theories and intuitions, as well as departing from the con- 
ception of individual agency that coincides historically with the 
dominance of rights thinking. However, it would be rash to sup- 
pose that we are dealing here only with rights talk. The circum- 
stances of groups are possible objects of the passions of rectitude 
and the obligations of governments. The assertion of group rights 
permits holding that they override the advantages enjoyed by 
other groups and even the possible benefits to everyone of the 
existence of privileged social strata.40 Moreover, when rights are 
claimed by groups, the claims typically entail no more than imper- 
fect obligations towards other elements of the wider society.41 In 
place of such virtues as charity and neighbourliness, holders of 
presumptive group rights often stress pride in their distinctness 
and independence from the rest of the society. The rights ascribed 
to groups thus celebrate the separateness and otherness that form a 
significant part of rights thinking. The whole basic framework of 
pure rights thinking is present here. It thus appears to remain an 
open possibility that rights thinking can encompass rights of 
groups, although it remains in doubt whether such an extension of 
the practice might flourish on account of its usefulness for 
addressing practical problems successfully. Two lines of argument 
suggest a negative answer. 
The growth of general civil and political rights extended privi- 
leges and provided universal protections and capacities that could 
attract most persons' loyalty once they had lost the bonds of tradi- 
tional community and the capacity to agree on a particular sense of 
the good. The extension of positive rights is possible in the welfare 
states because of widespread realization that all participants in a 
social system might enjoy a fair, if unequal, share in its benefits 
without harming economic prosperity, or even enhancing it by 
providing everyone with economic opportunities. In both cases, 
the entrenchment of rights occurs through general agreement 
rather than as the victory of one set of interests over another. In 
the absence of any independent moral law, fundamental rights 
must rest upon such a consensus. However, a comparable scenario 
for group rights is not easy to describe. The circumstances of the 
privileged and the disadvantaged are different in significant ways 
that make it difficult to promote general consensus on the compar- 
40 For a clear statement of the idea that the general advantage may be 
promoted by the existence of privileged strata, see John Rawls's explica- 
tion of democratic equality in A Theory of Justice, pp. 75-83. 
41 Cf. the characterization of group rights by Iris Young in Justice and 
the Politics of Difference, pp. 182-186. 
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isons that support the extension of rights to groups. Those who 
identify themselves as among the poor, for example, may be recep- 
tive to the analogy between privilege and freedom while those who 
are comfortable easily regard it as a gross confusion of distinct 
concepts and conditions. The impediment of such sharply con- 
trasting views leaves it doubtful that the causes of disadvantaged 
groups are best pursued through conceptions of rights. Since 
group rights are claimed on what many regard as questionable 
grounds, they thereby encourage continuing opposition from some 
rights thinkers. Moreover, as some critics of rights thinking sug- 
gest, group rights are difficult to reconcile with a conception of 
democracy that embraces all citizens, encourages general political 
participation, and possibly provides the best hope of the disadvan- 
taged. On this view, it is the sense of mutual responsibility that 
comes from taking the perspective of all people that may be most 
effectively translated into enhanced powers for those whose self- 
identity is tied to particular groups. 
The resort to rights thinking to improve the position of groups 
may therefore not be very useful in advancing their interests. 
Doubts arising both internally and externally to rights thinking 
count against expecting such an extension of rights to be success- 
ful, although not decisively, since there is no definite limit to such 
extensions fixed by the rules of rights thinking. It is not impossi- 
ble to conceive of a polity whose members found their primary 
sense of political identity in multicultural advancement. In coun- 
tries in which there are indigenous minorities or in which there 
have been decades of immigration, tensions between groups may 
be addressed by according to each the right to assistance with their 
independent development, and these rights are then plausibly 
demanded by other self-defeated communities. The happy result 
is the priority of responsibility within groups and of respect 
between them. Although the multicultural society has its attrac- 
tions, however, it must contend with the difficulty irony of resort- 
ing to rights in order to protect community. The standard of 
rights for communities does not represent a viable hybrid of caring 
and rights thinking, unless it can identify a way of dealing with 
circumstances in which the rights of one group to survive and 
flourish, conflict with those of other groups or with the established 
rights of all individuals. Intractable and deadly cultural hostilities 
may occur between rights holders unless it is possible to agree 
upon a threshold above which the general rights of individuals 
prevail over the rights of fundamental groups. The existence of 
such a threshold, however, entails that forms of cultural life are 
open to examination that leaves their members free to revise or 
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desert them, so that the right of groups to survive and flourish is 
very limited.42 
If instead group rights are conceived as basic and thus to tend 
towards the absoluteness of pure rights thinking, then there is 
another reason to believe that rights thinking is unlikely to remain 
useful. As already noted in connection with constitutionally 
entrenched welfare rights, to establish a right as basic in this way 
is to remove it from official political debate about public goods, 
making the threshold for considerations of general advantage and 
mutual responsibility very high. It is therefore to insulate the 
objects of rights thinking from the utilitarian and communal per- 
spectives, enabling judges to uphold positive rights without con- 
cern for their economic and social costs. This objection to seeking 
constitutional consensus on positive rights is well addressed by 
such expressions of a social charter as Rawls's difference principle, 
whose criterion of application includes economic and social bene- 
fit. Welfare rights are not to be pressed at the expense of the well- 
being or self-respect of the least advantaged. No such ready solu- 
tion is available for the corresponding objection to groups rights, 
which is that judges may uphold these rights without concern for 
their costs to national identity, hence without regard to the very 
consensus that is the condition of their legitimacy. Since successful 
politics is in large part the art of balancing such competing consid- 
erations, embodying the aspirations of groups in fundamental 
rights and withdrawing them from discussion removes from politi- 
cal thinking its capacity to consider serious social evils and to 
enhance social connection. By neglecting hybrid thinking in this 
way, we become unable to address matters of central human 
importance deliberately. The disadvantages of this depoliticization 
to the public spheres suggest that the continual extension of rights 
thinking will lose its pragmatic rationale before fully encompassing 
all existing things, all organisms, or even social groups. 
5. Conclusion 
Although this essay ranges over a number of central issues in 
recent discussion of rights, the several parts converge upon a pri- 
mary thesis, providing pieces of evidence which together support 
42 The freedom of each generation to determine its future for itself is an 
idea that runs through rights thinkers from Thomas Paine, in The Rights 
of Man, to Jiirgen Habermas, in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics 
of Recognition, ed by Amy Gutmann (Princeton University Press, 1994), 
pp. 130-131. 
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the general point that moral thinking is a self-sufficient practice or 
cluster of practices. Philosophers can usefully comment upon this 
practice, showing that it may be unwarranted or unwise to 
expunge portions of it or allow one portion to dominate the others. 
Rights thinking, in particular, is effective in resolving serious 
problems between people and should continue to claim adherents 
as long as it contributes to the hybrid vigour of moral reflection. 
However, I have also assembled reasons for holding that rights 
thinking and the other forms of moral thinking are not subject to 
negative or positive demonstration, that is, refutation or justifica- 
tion according to the strictest philosophical standards. To be sure, 
the refutation of a practice is not impossible. Rights thinking could 
be rejected if it led to dilemmas about action, but it is far more 
likely that it will simply fail to identify the correct course of action 
in certain circumstances. Deep contradictions are not to be expect- 
ed in a practice whose rules have been thoroughly tested, but the 
rules may still prove unequal to their task. The justification of a 
practice of thinking, beyond its internal consistency and pragmatic 
value, is a more philosophically dubious proposition. 
Consider the theory of 'operative rights' recently developed by 
Beth J. Singer. In a thesis that is broadly consistent with mine she 
describes rights as 'historically evolved social institutions' and 
operative in the 'exercise of individual judgment'. Hence, rights 
are 'institutionalized in the communities to which we belong' and 
exist 'only in communities whose norms prescribe respect for 
them'.43 However, Singer adds that certain 'universal human 
needs' are 'necessary conditions of normative community' and 
finds that 'dialogic reciprocity is the basis of the authority of all 
social norms'.44 From such a standpoint, she argues, it is a straight- 
forward matter to show that animals cannot have rights but that 
communities can. 
The problem with this line of argument is much more serious 
than Flathman's weak justification of the practice of rights. It 
offers not a practice-account but an ideal-practice-account. By 
describing such an ideal practice appropriately it is certainly possi- 
ble to define a priori exclusions and potentialities. Thus, animals 
cannot possibly have rights because they cannot enter into the 
rights-relations that require respect for the rights of others, but 
communities may have rights because they can engage in dialogic 
reciprocity. This is a version of Habermas's discourse ethics, 
43 Beth J. Singer, Operative Rights (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1993), pp. xiii-xv. 
44 Ibid. pp. 62, 97. 
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which attempts to derive universal moral requirements from the 
presuppositions of argumentation, 'discourse or argumentation 
[being] a more exacting type of communication, going beyond any 
particular form of life'.45 While the norms of such ideal communi- 
cation are plausible standards for actual practices, however, they 
are not logically derived from these practices. The proposed norms 
do not restrict what it is possible for actual speakers to do, such as 
lying to one another. Lying is inconsistent with the rules of ideal 
discourse ethics, but it is an action perfectly possible in ordinary 
communication and is not incoherent behaviour amongst those 
who actually argue with one another. So, too, for the actual prac- 
tice of rights thinking, in which the ascription of rights to animals 
and communities is a matter in which no a priori determination 
should be expected. 
The indefinite scope of this practice can also be described in 
terms of sensitivity to thresholds. As we have noted, utilitarian 
thinking is particularly appropriate in contexts in which serious 
good beckons or evil threatens. To a first approximation, these are 
contexts in which the seriousness of the good or the evil is demon- 
strable, making it easy to see that the agent had no moral choice 
but to act contrary to laws or rights. Where this demonstration is 
not possible, one remains below the evidential threshold, that is 
within the region where rights thinking appropriately dominates. 
Now, it is easy to understand philosophical dissatisfaction with 
this merely formal point. In practice, thresholds are imprecise, 
being distinguished by grey areas rather than sharp lines. This 
imprecision is what makes the grey areas inevitable sites of moral 
difficulty and social controversy. Although there are clear cases, 
there are also those in which one must trust to discrimination 
rather than rules, and perceptions differ. 
It is clear that the identification of thresholds depends power- 
fully upon social opinion. To assess a person as sufficiently dis- 
criminating, perceptive, or sensitive is to employ norms of judg- 
ment from which the social element cannot be abstracted. Such 
assessments are, of course, very complicated. They presuppose the 
kind of capacity for independent judgment that is demonstrated by 
imaginative extensions of norms to novel cases in contrast to slav- 
ish conformity to rule, but there must be a rough consensus, an 
established practice, from which to depart. The importance of 
imagination may be expressed in saying that in matters subject to 
judgment there is no objectively right answer, but for there even to 
be a question worth debating there must be the shared assump- 
45 Jiirgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), p. 202. 
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tions represented by conventional opinion. It therefore seems a 
reasonable conjecture that where social cohesion is so poor and 
shared assumptions so few that thresholds are impossible to dis- 
cern, pure rights thinking may enjoy a great advantage. In authori- 
tarian regimes whose rulers have a clear vision of the good society 
utilitarian thinking may be dominant and rights may be ignored, 
but in an open society pure utilitarian thinking is hampered not 
only by threshold questions but also by doubts about what consti- 
tutes a public good. This further promotes a culture in which 
political issues are routinely discussed in terms of rights. Under 
these circumstances rights claims may extend well beyond civil 
and political protections to economic entitlements, justice for the 
natural environment, or the advancement of any other political 
cause. 
Notwithstanding contention about the location of thresholds, 
multi-dimensional moral and political discussion depends upon 
sensitivity to them. Without recognizing thresholds, the hybrid 
thinking in which conflicts among rights, utility, and concern in 
relationships assume moral interest does not occur. I have suggest- 
ed that for pure rights and utilitarian thinkers, such moral dilem- 
mas fail to arise. However, they do not arise for hybrid thinkers 
either. As long as appropriate thresholds can be recognized, it is 
clear when rights or utility should prevail. In the grey areas in 
which the threshold cannot be located exactly individuals will be 
uncertain (often painfully) and people will disagree (sometimes 
vigorously). These situations do not pose philosophical dilemmas, 
however. Rather, they are among the cases in which it is not possi- 
ble to identify the desirable course of action with confidence. 
There is no demonstrably correct judgment, so that one is faced 
with a practical quandary in which one must decide for oneself. 
This is not to say that one must simply depend upon personal 
opinion but rather that one must do one's best to exercise respon- 
sible moral authority in the absence of clear guides. The philos- 
ophical examination of rights thinking shows that it is as rational 
as any practice one can define. 
McMaster University 
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